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Abstract
Health information exchange (HIE) is expected to
improve the quality and cost of healthcare but
sustained use of HIE by providers has been difficult to
achieve. A number of factors play a role in that
process including concern for the security and privacy
of the exchanged information. This tension between
the expected benefits of HIE resulting from
collaboration and information sharing on the one
hand, and the potential security risks inherent in the
exchange process on the other hand, is not well
understood. We propose an information security
control theory to explain this tension. We evaluate this
theory through a case study of the iterative
development of the information security policy for an
HIE in the western United States. We find that the
theory offers a good framework through which to
understand the information security policy
development process.

1. Introduction
The digital transformation of healthcare is
expected to improve care quality and reduce the costs
of providing quality care [6]. An important element of
that process is interoperability (i.e., the ability of
healthcare organizations to digitally exchange
information). The National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology asserts that, “interoperability
is necessary for a “learning health system” in which
health information flows seamlessly and is available to
the right people, at the right place, at the right time”
[1]. The value of interoperability has been recognized
for some time with the development of community
health management information systems (CHMISs) in
the early to mid-1990’s, community health
information networks (CHINs) in the mid to late
1990’s, and regional health information organizations
(RHIOs) in the 2000’s [34]. More recently, the 2009
HITECH Act included nearly $550 million in federal
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funding for the development of Health Information
Exchanges (HIEs) in every state and U.S. territory.
However, the limited success of these initiatives
demonstrates that the route to effective and sustained
interoperability is multi-faceted and insufficiently
understood [13].
One of the main challenges for interoperability is
maintaining the security and privacy of the protected
health information that is transmitted through the HIE
[13, 37]. According to the Identity Theft Resource
Center, in 2015, the healthcare sector experienced
more than one third of all publicly reported data
breaches [20]. Security breaches can have serious
consequences, not only for patients, through identity
theft or disclosure of private health records, but also
for the healthcare organizations that stand to be
impacted financially, through loss of reputation, trust,
and potential legal and regulatory consequences.
Threats to the security of health data are expected to
remain high because of the value of medical records
on the black market [2].
Unfortunately, the
information systems in healthcare organizations are
often not very robust when it comes to security.
Hospitals, such as Hollywood Presbyterian and
Kansas Heart proved highly vulnerable to a 2016 spate
of ransomware attacks. In at least one case where a
ransom was paid, the attackers only partly restored
hospital data, demanding further ransom [31].
A tension, therefore, exists between the expected
value of facilitating interoperability and the potential
threat of security breaches, since the information
exchange process could expose patients and providers
to significant harm. Security controls must be
sufficient to protect the data, but not restrictive to the
point that they impede interoperability. Creating and
sustaining an effective security program is essential to
the achievement of the goal of balancing security and
interoperability. A good security program starts with
the development of an information security policy
[36]. While an information security policy is
prescribed by many as an essential component of an
effective security program, there is little research on
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the factors that go into developing that policy, and
even less on the impact that the aforementioned
tension plays in the policy development process.
Therefore, an important research question for
understanding and explaining what enables health
information exchange is, how does the essential
tension between sharing and protecting health data
impact the development of information security
policies?
This research answers that question by proposing a
theoretical framework that provides a mechanism for
balancing the tension between sharing and protecting
information. We evaluate the framework by
investigating how an HIE in the western United States
addressed the tension, between protecting and sharing
health data, in the development of their information
security policies. We investigate the HIE’s iterative
policy development process through the theoretical
lens of security controls reasoning and find that the
framework is helpful in understanding and developing
information security policies to support the HIE’s goal
of interoperability, while maintaining the privacy and
security of the information managed by the exchange.

2. Theoretical background
Fundamental goals for information security
include the confidentiality, availability, and integrity
of data and the development of controls to support
those goals [14, 3]. However, much of the published
research on information security is limited in its
consideration of the theoretical foundations that
underpin it, and that which does typically makes use
of theories that are applicable to a very limited range
of the information security spectrum [30]. For
example, economic theories (i.e., return on
investment, internal rate of return, etc.) have been used
to explain the financial value of controls and how that
valuation is used to prioritize the decisions to
implement those controls [15]; while general
deterrence theory (GDT) has been used to explain
human behavior and the design of controls to combat
computer crime and intentional abuse [33]. Global
theories that could broadly explain a wide range of
phenomena in information security are lacking either
because they are not highly valued or because
information security scholars have tended to focus on
very specific phenomena in their research. In addition,
there is a general disconnect between information
security research that engages in security theory
development and empirical information security
papers [30]. This research aims to address these gaps
in the literature by proposing a theoretical framework
specific to information security, but one that is broadly

applicable to a variety of security phenomena, and
assessing that framework through an empirical
investigation thus addressing both rigor and relevance.
The essential tension identified in our study
suggests forms of reasoning that are neither financial
nor deterrent. Rather, it is a tension between sharing
and protecting data. Sharing involves reasoning with
an aim to expose sensitive data to outsiders (i.e., other
individuals or organizations). On the other hand,
protecting data is reasoning with an aim to seclude the
data. Decision settings where there may be multiple,
conflicting aims and multiple forms of reasoning have
been noted in prior literature in decision analysis [22],
healthcare [16], education [28], etc. The purpose of
this research is not to replicate prior research in multiobjective decision analysis, but rather, to explore the
two essential, conflicting objectives in the context of
information sharing and information security. This is
important because these conflicting objectives are
unique to information security, especially in
healthcare settings, where sharing of information can
provide enormous benefits, while also creating the
burden of information protection.
This research proposes that these conflicting
objectives incorporate two interrelated forms of
security reasoning: exposure control reasoning and
ethical control reasoning. The theory is based on the
premise that the decision to enact controls to protect
information systems is a fundamental and meaningful
outcome of setting information security policies.
Therefore, the decision to adopt an information
security policy is an effective place to begin a search
for explanations of otherwise unexplained information
security behaviors. Exposure and ethics are chosen as
the two anchors of controls policy reasoning because
both concepts are prevalent and persistent in the
information security literature [23, 11]. These two
forms of control reasoning are often treated separately,
although in most settings they combine to explain how
decision makers decide between which controls to set
into policy, and which ones to forego, because the
controls are too difficult or expensive to acquire or
operate.

2.1 Exposure control reasoning
Exposure control reasoning is based on the fact
that information assets (e.g., end-user devices, servers,
networks, etc.) are inherently exposed to threats (e.g.,
human error, hackers, fires, etc.) Threat exposure
includes threats of any potential exposure, disclosure,
breach of confidentiality, or any form of risk
exposures that may arise from external threat sources,
or, insider threats. Exposure control reasoning aims to
manage those risk exposures [8, 29] through the
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identification and placement of controls between
assets and threats. However, this process is complex
and challenging because assets and threats may be
linked to each other in a multitude of ways.
Consequently, the addition of security requirements
and controls into an information system can be
expected to meaningfully increase the cost and
complexity of the system and its operation. This is
why information security researchers and practitioners
must focus on both, the analysis of assets, and the
analysis of threats. Therefore, exposure control
reasoning is an important component of many
formalized approaches to information security.
One form of exposure control reasoning is
represented in Figure 1. This figure represents an
insecure system with the set of an organization’s
information assets (A) in relation to a set of
information threats (T). The arrows represent edges
between the members of each set. In this case, the
edges (T-A) are exposures [17].
A1
A2
A3

T1
T2
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T4
Tn

Am
T

A

Figure 1. Threat-asset exposure edges (adapted
from Hoffman et al [17])
Exposure control reasoning aims to control such
exposures by creating a set of controls (C) that protect
organizational assets from security exposures. Each
control is inserted to eliminate the edges between
threats and assets. The aim is to replace each T-A edge
with a T-C edge and a C-A edge. See Figure 2.

the likelihood of threats and the value of assets.
Ethical controls reasoning can take a number of forms,
but the most common are utilitarian and deontological
reasoning. Utilitarian reasoning focuses on achieving
the greatest good and relies on risk analysis to
determine the degree of hazard to important
stakeholders [10]. Virtually all security design
methodologies adopt some form of risk analysis as a
central activity for determining whether a control is
justified.
Alternatively, deontological reasoning
focuses on the moral duty of adherence to rules, and is
used as the basis for compliance with laws and
regulations [10]. For example, HIE privacy and
security controls are currently governed by the 2013
HIPAA Final Rule.
One prevalent form of ethical control reasoning is
the typical risk treatment framework, for example
Jones & Ashenden [21]. Such frameworks map risk
treatments (controls) into categories suitable for
different values of threat frequency and threat impact.
(See Figure 3.) High frequency, low impact threats are
given different treatments than low frequency, high
impact threats, etc. Such treatment decisions are
essentially a form of utilitarian ethical reasoning.
Control treatments are enacted where they do the
greatest good, and not where they do little good. For
example, the risk of vandalism by an external hacker
is a form of risk that can be high in frequency, but low
in impact. The implementation of common selfprotection mechanisms such as firewalls and VPN
access for external users is an effective response to that
threat, while cutting off all access from outside the
organization will have little additional benefit while
significantly impeding legitimate work. The goal is
not to eliminate risk but rather to shift it down and to
the left within the framework without enacting
controls that are more impediment than benefit.
High Impact
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Figure 2. Threat-control-asset edges (adapted
from Hoffman et al [17])

2.2 Ethical control reasoning
Ethical control reasoning arises in the need to make
rational decisions about controls adoption. These
decisions rely on ethical reasoning because sometimes
controls are unavailable or too costly in relationship to
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Figure 3. Risk treatment framework (adapted
from Jones & Ashenden [21])
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2.3 Formulating policies
Exposure control reasoning and ethical control
reasoning interact with each other in the formulation
of information security policies. The creation of
information security policies is a fundamental action
in information security as it provides the basis for an
organization’s approach to information security and is
the foundational document by which procedures and
controls are selected and implemented [4, 12].
Therefore, the application of both exposure and ethical
controls reasoning in the development of an
information security policy is essential to create a
policy that takes into account, the assets and threats for
which security controls must be implemented, the
needs of relevant stakeholders, and the requirements
of requisite laws and regulations, to enable both the
sharing and protection of information.
Research has considered the role [18], importance
[35], structure [4], and content [12] of the information
security policy, but none have directly addressed the
essential tension between the need to both share and
protect information that is fundamental to
organizations like an HIE. Our theoretical model
addresses that tension and we apply the model to an
HIE to understand how the tension is managed through
the information security policy development process
in such an organization.

2.4 The essential tension
In formulating and applying security policies for
an HIE, the policy developers have to balance the
requirements of ensuring interoperability and
availability of information to authorized parties, while
at the same time ensuring confidentiality, integrity and
overall security. For controlling the threat of any kind
of malicious or accidental exposure of information that
may result in a security breach, including breach of
confidentiality, policy makers can adopt exposure
control reasoning. Similarly, they can use ethical
control reasoning to rationalize the decisions on the
appropriate level of controls. However, these two
forms of reasoning must be balanced to both enable
the sharing of information and protecting that
information. Thus, exposure and ethical controls
reasoning, correspond to the tension between the aims
of “sharing” and “protection” in creating an HIE
security policy. Exposure control reasoning aims to
develop complete security and privacy, creating a path
to ensure we protect everything.
It offers a
mathematical frame that is verifiably complete and
secure. Ethical control reasoning, in contrast, aims to
make rational decisions about what not to protect. It
assumes that a fully protected system is expensive and

morally unreasonable. It accepts there are trade-offs
in security, such as the tradeoff between complete
security and complete interoperability. It guides the
reasoning across a threshold where some exposures
are acceptable. The occurrence of these risks is
acceptable because such events can be insured, or they
are inexpensive, or they are avoidable in operation, or
safeguards are sufficiently effective.
Our identification of this theoretical tension is not
intended as a normative substitute for existing theories
and methods of multi-criteria decision making.
Rather, this tension helps explicate the knowledge and
preferences of the decision maker [19] that is a
necessary input to multi-criteria decisions. It offers a
clear frame for illuminating the contradictory inputs to
the decision process. Normatively, multi-criteria
decision theories, such as Multiple Attribute Utility
Theory [5, 22] or the Analytical Hierarchy Process,
can then be employed for the decision-making process
itself [27].

3. Case study
A qualitative case study was utilized to evaluate an
HIE’s information security policy development
process. The HIE in this study, which shall henceforth
be known as WesternHIE, is located in the western
United States and includes participating healthcare
organizations across the entire state in which it
operates. The HIE was initially formed in 2011 and
continues to operate successfully experiencing growth
with 89 healthcare organizations currently
participating in the exchange, representing a sizeable
portion of the state’s healthcare community.

3.1. Method
This was not an a priori study of the tension
between sharing and protecting data. Rather it was an
exploratory study to understand the role of security
policy development in the success of an HIE.
Therefore, a qualitative research approach was
employed because it provided the flexibility necessary
to pursue emergent avenues of inquiry as data
collection progressed [24].
Arrangements for data collection were coordinated
through the HIE’s executive director, who was known
to one of the authors. Pursuant to the goals of the
study, the executive director arranged meetings or
provided contact information for everyone still with
the organization or still available for contact who had
participated in the HIE’s information security policy
development process at one point or another. Within
that scope of access, semi-structured interviews were
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conducted, either in person or over the phone, with the
executive director, five other HIE staff members and
an external consultant.
In qualitative research, semi-structured interviews
help guide the participants in sharing their accounts of
events and processes that are relevant to the research
focus, while enabling the researcher to follow new
lines of inquiry as the incoming data suggests.
Therefore, while the initial questions were structured
to the extent that they focused the conversation on the
security policy development process, subsequent
questions were adapted to pursue emerging ideas both
within specific interviews and in subsequent
interviews [24]. Interviews took place over a four
month period in 2015 and were conducted by one or
more of the authors. All interviews were audiorecorded with the exception of one in which the
participant asked not to be recorded. Documentation
was also collected and analyzed including the different
versions of the security policy, policy development
timelines, and the document deliverables at each stage
of the policy development process.
Analysis of the data started after the initial
interview and continued through the completion of
data collection. Interview transcripts and document
data were analyzed at different points by all of the
authors in an iterative process of data reduction and
conclusion drawing [25] with the goal of identifying
elements of the information security development
process that explained how the HIE had been
successful in developing and growing the exchange.
Through this process we identified the tension
between sharing and protecting data that the HIE had
to address through the development, implementation,
and revision of their information security policies.
The following account details that iterative process.

3.2. HIE security policy development
WesternHIE has gone through three distinct
iterations of information security policy development
since the organization was created in 2011.
3.2.1. First iteration. WesternHIE was created by the
state’s Quality Improvement Organization (QIO). The
QIO had been approached by several individuals from
the state’s healthcare community to take the lead in
setting up an HIE for the state. They agreed, but
quickly decided to spin off the HIE both to avoid a
conflict of interest, and to generate buy-in from the
community because it required them to ask the
community for board members for the HIE.
“What better way to get buy-in then to reach
out to our community and say, look, we need

board members. You’re going to help shape
and move technology within the state.” (HIT
Director)
The WestermHIE board contracts with the QIO to
operationalize the exchange that includes a
management contract, which means that WesternHIE
has no employees, they are instead employees of the
QIO.
One result of this arrangement is that
WesternHIE does not have a dedicated Information
Security Officer (ISO), but instead makes use of the
QIO’s ISO as necessary. This had implications for the
information security policy development process at
WesternHIE.
WesternHIE’s HIT Director said that most HIEs
would set up their governance structure first and then
select a vendor to provide the hardware and software
for the exchange.
“Most HIE’s would establish their governance
structure and organizational structure and
then go through a vendor selection … We did
not do that. We made a conscious decision to
run two parallel paths. One is governance and
how do we set up the infrastructure. The
second was … we wanted to put the vendor in
place and start getting out to show physicians
that this could actually work.” (HIT Director)
That created crossover in WesternHIE’s startup
processes because they needed certain things in place
to operationalize the HIE (e.g., privacy and security
policies). Therefore, in the summer of 2011, eight task
forces were established by the WesternHIE board of
directors to develop a plan for the major components
of the HIE (e.g., Privacy and Security and Data Use
Agreement Task Force, Financial Sustainability Task
Force, Governance and Outreach Task Force, etc.).
The task-force development process was cofacilitated by the WesternHIE executive director, and
an external consultant who served as the expert on
Federal policy.
The task forces comprised
WesternHIE staff as well as members of the
community (e.g., the privacy and security task force
comprised 13 members that included a hospital
privacy officer who was also an attorney, the director
of health information management at another hospital,
the general counsel for a third hospital, a state
Medicaid administrator, the corporate compliance
manager for a large physician’s group, ...) The
diversity of participants was both a benefit and a
challenge because, while multiple perspectives
produced a greater range of ideas, each participant also
had to consider other perspectives and think more
broadly [7, 9].
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The task forces met once in July 2011 and twice in
August to discuss their area of focus and develop a
recommendation for how WesternHIE should
proceed.
The privacy and security policy
recommendations were driven by the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, Security Rule, and Breach and Notification
Rule. There were 42 HIPAA standards which needed
to be examined and addressed in the developed
policies. For example, the preamble to the HIPAA
Final Rule specifically defines an HIE as a Business
Associate of a Covered Entity. Therefore, the policies
had to be developed keeping that structure in mind.
“What I always go back to is, what is the Rule?
What is the Privacy Rule? What is the Security
Rule? … and we mapped standard by
standard.” (External Consultant)
In this early stage of the HIE, the tension between
protecting and sharing data was evident. There was
the goal of getting the technology up and running to
quickly generate buy-in from physicians that an
exchange could work, while at the same time the
privacy and security task force recognized the need to
create security policies based on HIPAA regulations to
protect the data that would be exchanged. Both
exposure and ethical control reasoning were employed
in the parallel paths of setting up the governance
structure for the HIE and getting the exchange running
as a proof of concept for providers.
However, the consultant worried that the ethical
reasoning over-excluded both utilitarian reasoning and
exposure reasoning. In other words, the aim to seclude
was unnecessarily eclipsing the (more strategic) aim to
expose or share. For example, she noted that with
regard to HIPAA compliance by HIE participants,
“Many of the hospitals in particular may have
developed policies that are more strict than
HIPAA … and that can often become a problem
because the point of the HIE is to share the
information and share the data in a secure way,
but also you don’t want to put up roadblocks to
having providers and others being able to
access information when they need it.”
(External Consultant)
She was not only conditioning the ethical
reasoning, that is, filtering a dominant deontological
reasoning with a utilitarian lens. She was also
reasoning about acceptable levels of exposure. For
example, there was a recognition that all participants
in an HIE together comprised a collective “weak-link
phenomenon”. When one participant suffers a data
breach, all participants would suffer [26].

“I initially put together several examples of
data use agreements, because, especially in an
HIE, it’s very important to have an agreement
that goes beyond a business associate
agreement so the HIE has clear written
relationships with their providers that are part
of the HIE [so] each of those providers is
meeting their obligations to the HIE.”
(External Consultant)
Each task force generated a report for their focus
area. These were provided to the external consultant
in September for aggregation into a full report to the
WesternHIE board of directors. The final report
generated by the external consultant was completed
and submitted to the board in October 2011 and
represented a roadmap for how to proceed in building
out the HIE. WesternHIE then took that roadmap and
began developing the organizational structures to
achieve the goals of the roadmap. For privacy and
security that meant constructing the actual policies and
procedures.
There was a defined end-date for the initial task
forces, but WesternHIE subsequently set up two new
task forces, one for patient consent, which has since
been twilighted and policies were written out of it, and
one for compliance and audit, which is an ongoing
group. The compliance and audit group is an advisory
group set up by the board to make sure WesternHIE is
doing audits appropriately and provide advice on what
to do in regard to actionable items. The compliance
and audit group is the only community group still in
place, but WesternHIE also have an internal policy
committee that meets a couple of times each month.
The initial set of privacy and security policies were
written by WesternHIE staff based on the roadmap
constructed by the Privacy and Security and Data Use
Agreement Task Force. At this point, the reasoning
shifted from predominantly one of seclusion which
was deontological in nature to a more utilitarian focus.
The HIT director noted that writing a policy is easy,
but getting staff buy-in is difficult.
“Inevitably you get the GM nod from a lot of
staff and then they go back to doing what they
have typically done in the past…. How do you
take a policy and make it part of the culture?”
(HIT Director)
Certain policies also had a more utilitarian focus
with regard to the participant’s needs because the
participants would be most impacted by those
particular policies. The consent policy was one in
which the participants would be responsible for
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gaining consent from patients and therefore the policy
development process took more input from
participants.
“We met once a month for six months to bring
the community back together to say, okay,
you’re going to be the ones getting the
consents. Where would this fit in the doctor’s
office? How would you go about this? What
would the flow be? Developing the policy for
that, developing the form, developing the fact
sheet that you give to somebody.” (Executive
Director)
At this point, the information security officer,
because of the relationship noted earlier, had not been
directly involved in the development of the
information security policies for WesternHIE.
3.2.2. Second iteration. In 2013 WesternHIE decided
they needed some expert help to evaluate their existing
policies and the information security officer (ISO)
offered to take charge of that process, which kicked off
on September 9, 2013.
“We needed more [policies], we needed to
make sure what we had was correct … we
wanted some confirmation, some validation
about what we had done because he’s the
expert.” (Executive Director)
In addition to the ISO, there were two other
WesternHIE staff members on the core evaluation
team along with a four-member project steering
committee that included the ISO. The ISO’s plan was
to assess WesternHIE’s security posture using NIST
guidelines [32] for the evaluation, but he also looked
to outside sources to see what other HIE’s around the
country were doing. He felt the evaluation process at
WesternHIE was not as well-defined and structured as
he had experienced in other contexts and that the
participants were often distracted with other tasks and
did not put enough value on the evaluation process.
He also felt there was a limited awareness by the staff
on how to carry out the process, so he had to spend
time educating the other participants on how to
properly conduct the evaluation.
There is a growing presence of exposure control
reasoning as the need for evaluation rises. There is
also an introduction of NIST guidelines as a driver of
deontological reasoning to balance the early focus on
HIPAA rules. Concerns that reflect exposure control
reasoning include worries that someone could hack a
partner organization in the HIE and use it as a
backdoor to compromise other partners. In order to

overcome this risk exposure, all partners will need to
be strong, and their relationships need to be good
enough to maintain a high level of security for the HIE.
The evaluation included a gap assessment where
HIPAA required/best practice privacy and security
policies were compared with WesternHIE’s existing
policies. For example, the policy on permitted use and
disclosure existed, but it was considered “thin” and
therefore the team concluded that it should be updated
to reflect the HIPAA Final Rule of 2013, while the
policy on receiving and resolving complaints and or
concerns did not exist, and therefore the team
concluded that a policy and procedures should be
developed using the best practice example. The
evaluation process lasted four weeks and was
completed on October 3, 2013 which then led to a
period of policy writing and revising.
3.2.3. Third iteration. In late 2014, another round of
policy evaluation took place, but this time the ISO was
not involved in the process and it was primarily carried
out by a new set of staff members who were not
involved in the 2013 evaluation.
“Here’s an area where we could use some
extra eyes and ears. We need to update, we
need to review these [privacy and security
policies].” (Executive Director)
At that point, WesternHIE had 60+ privacy and
security policies, many of which had been added as a
result of the 2013 evaluation. The evaluation team
started by prioritizing the policies and removing those
that were specific to certain procedures, which helped
to reduce the scope of their work. They also found that
many were written from the perspective of a covered
entity. The HIE is not a covered entity, but is instead
a business associate of participating covered entities.
Therefore policies that focused on the HIE as a
covered entity, could also be eliminated. Finally,
because of their relationship to the QIO, they found
that many of the policies were part of the QIO’s
policies that WesternHIE could use indirectly.
Therefore, the ISO had indirect involvement in the
process because he had authored many of the QIO
policies that were used in whole or in part by
WesternHIE. In addition, they found that there was
significant variation in how the policies were
structured, so they developed a standard template with
clear instructions and examples for future policy
writers. The template was based on the experience that
some of the team members had with policy writing in
other organizations.
The decision to develop and implement a policy
template reflected ethical control reasoning with a
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utilitarian focus because the goal was not to reanalyze
the policies from the perspective of threats and assets
but to make the policies easier to read and use by
participants. Policy drafting started with the
assignment of a policy owner who could be the person
who identified the need or another person in that
functional area. The owner of a policy was responsible
for writing the policy and the template made that
responsibility much less daunting. The revised
policies were then sent out to the HIE participants for
review. Participants had 45 days to review the policy
and submit questions.
“We do send these policies out after they are
approved [by the compliance and audit
committee]. We look for feedback, is there
anything we overlooked or that would be a
concern to them as participants?” (Policy
Intern)
This also reflects a focus on ethical controls
reasoning with a utilitarian goal of understanding the
needs of participants and incorporating those needs, as
appropriate, into the policies.
They originally
anticipated that the process would take 2-3 months but
it ended up taking a year to complete. In the end, the
policies were reduced from 60+ to 14.
Through this process of developing, implementing,
and revising the HIE’s information security policies
the list of participant organization’s continued to grow
and currently includes as active members of the HIE:
62 physician offices, 9 acute care hospitals, 7
diagnostic services, and 1 health plan. With that many
participants, each of which is ultimately responsible
for the health information they share through the
exchange, agreement and compliance with the HIE’s
information security policies has not been
homogeneous, but the HIE contends that the general
perception and engagement with the process and the
resulting policies has been very positive both from
active participants and the community at large.

4. Discussion
In order to evaluate our theoretical framework, we
analyzed the tension between sharing and protecting
health data on WesternHIE’s information security
policy development process. For this, we considered
the ways in which exposure and ethical control
reasoning were utilized by the members of the HIE to
develop their information security policies and
assessed how those two forms of reasoning interacted
in the policy development process.

Exposure control reasoning is concerned with the
implementation of controls to separate assets from
their associated threats. For WesternHIE this started
with an analysis of the assets and threats that would be
relevant to an HIE. In creating the initial task force for
privacy and security, WesternHIE’s decision to
include participants from the healthcare and legal
domains was predicated on the belief that diversity
would produce a range of perspectives to better
identify the relevant assets and threats for which
controls would need to be defined in the information
security policies.
The second iteration of WesternHIE’s information
security policies was initiated on the belief that the
expertise of the information security officer could help
identify gaps in the assets and threats for which the
policies were written. Here the tension between
sharing and protecting was most pronounced as the
ISO was focused on protection while the other
members of the HIE were more focused on enabling
their participants to exchange data with fewer
restrictions. The result of that assessment and revision
was the expansion of the information security policies
to include controls for additional assets and threats
identified by the ISO.
The third iteration, which did not involve the ISO
directly, was focused on refining and consolidating the
organization’s policies by applying a uniform template
to all policies and eliminating those that were focused
too narrowly on specific procedures or roles. The
belief was that a high number of policies in nonstandard formats would not be effective as a
mechanism for securing information assets because
the policies would be less likely to be read and applied.
In other words, reasoning focused too heavily on
exposure control can lead to a set of policies that
appear to provide comprehensive guidance on the
implementation of controls to protect organizational
assets from security threats, but run the risk of being
rarely consulted and therefore ineffective.
Ethical control reasoning is concerned with the
rational for how decisions are made regarding
information security controls. When WesternHIE was
created the organization was deliberately set up to
include board members from the healthcare
community and taskforces were created that included
a diversity of members from the healthcare
community. This represents a focus on utilitarian
reasoning in which the goal was to form a group that
would be best positions to determine how the HIE
should be built to facilitate the greatest good for the
community in which it would operate. In addition, an
external consultant was brought in to serve as an
expert on the legal requirements for HIE, which
represents a focus on deontological reasoning to make
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sure the HIE was going to be compliant with federal
law, specifically HIPAA and state law.
In the second iteration, the information security
officer chose to assess the information security
policies using NIST guidelines for evaluation and
followed a structured approach that would produce a
more rigorous and complete set of policies. He was
concerned that the system connections between the
HIE and the QIO would allow someone to hack into
the HIE and use it as a backdoor into the QIO.
Therefore, a weak HIE was a vulnerability for the QIO
for which he was responsible. Consequently, the
ethical control reasoning of the ISO was focused
primarily on a utilitarian perspective of what was best
for the QIO.
The third iteration relied more heavily on
deontological reasoning as the HIE staff strove to
work with participants to formulate policies that would
work for them. The consent policy was an example of
this where the participants would be the ones engaging
in consent activities so they were consulted more
directly on the consent policy and forms. The goal was
to produce a set of policies that were more accessible
to both HIE staff and participants.
For WesternHIE the tension between sharing and
protection in the development of information security
policies was always present, but the reasoning applied
to manage that tension shifted from one iteration to the
next. The first iteration was probably the most
balanced in terms of how exposure and ethical control
reasoning was applied to the policy development
process as the privacy and security task force
constructed a roadmap for the HIE’s initial round of
policy development. The second iteration was much
more focused on exposure control reasoning as the
ISO attempted to bring more rigor and a stronger
security focus to the policy development process. The
third iteration shifted to ethical control reasoning as
the HIE staff saw the number of policies and their nonstandardized structure as impediments to the use of
those policies by staff and participants and a hindrance
to participants in the use of the HIE.
This framework therefore suggests that as
organizations develop their information security
policies and more generally consider their information
security program, both exposure and ethical control
reasoning are necessary to balance the tension between
protecting and sharing information. This means that
focusing on one type of reasoning over the other, while
not necessarily a problem, will shift the focus of the
tension to either sharing or protection.

5. Conclusion
The exchange of health information between
providers is considered critical to the improvement of
healthcare both in better care quality and cost
reduction.
To increase participation in health
information exchange and sustain that participation
over time, healthcare organizations and individual
consumers must feel confident that the information
shared and accessed through the exchange is secure
and private. The inherent tension in this process
between the need to share and desire to protect health
information has impacted the achievement of greater
interoperability.
We introduce a theory of information security
control that considers the development of an
information security policy, as a foundational and
fundamental process in information security, through
the relationship between exposure control reasoning
and ethical control reasoning. We find that these two
forms of reasoning can be used to balance the tension
between sharing and protecting information and that
an effective information security policy development
process that brings together stakeholders, experts, and
prior codified knowledge, can provide an important
foundation for a successful HIE.
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